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EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF
PREVIOus CRIMES UPON ISSUED DE-
GREE OF PUNISHMENT WHERE TRIAL
Is BEFORE A JURY.- [Federal] De-
fendant, Daihover, a member of
the notorious Brady gang, plead
guilty to a charge of murder of a
state policeman while escaping
from the robbery of the Goodland
State Bank of Goodland, Indiana.
The bank was an insured bank un-
der 48 Stat. 783 (1934), 12 USCA
§588c, and as such the defendant
came under Federal jurisdiction;
this act provided that on trial both
the guilt and the punishment were
to be matters for jury considera-
tion. Dalhover admitted after his
capture that he and his two cohorts
had in their careers robbed ap-
proximately 150 stores, 4 jewelry
stores, and 3 banks previous to the
Goodland robbery. The issue on
appeal was whether evidence of
these previous crimes, readily con-
fessed by the defendant, was prop-
erly admissible in the proceedings
before the jury to determine the
punishmnt. The majority of the
court ruled that this evidence was
perfectly proper. A strong dissent
contended that the proceedings
should be conducted under the
rules of evidence which would have
applied if the proceedings were a
trial to determine guilt; under such
rules the dissent finds this evidence
would have been barred. United
States v. Dalhover, 96 F. (2d) 355
(C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
That evidence of other unrelated
crimes is not admissible in the trial
of a criminal case, as a general rule,
is too well recognized to require
elaboration 1 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d ed., 1923) §300; Underhill,
Criminal Evidence (3rd ed., 1923)
§150; 1 Jones, Evidence, (1913)
§145. However, there are certain
times when crimes other than the
one for which the defendant is be-
ing tried are related to the crime
of the indictment so that evidence
of them is within the legitimate
field of evidence to be considered;
i. e., where two or more crimes are
part of one transaction. Miller v.
State, 13 Okla. Cr. 176, 163 Pac. 131
(1917); where it is necessary to
complete the res gestae. Gibson v.
State, 14 Ala. App. 111, 72 So. 210
(1916); where motive need be
shown. State v. Martin, 47 Ore.
282, 83 Pac. 849 (1906); where the
identity of the accuser is in ques-
tion, Romes v. Commonwealth, 164
Ky. 334, 175 S. W. 669 (1915); to
rebut a defense or alibi. People
v. Mandrell, 306 Ill. 413, 138 N. E.
215 (1923) or in particular classes
of crimes such as sex crimes to
show inclination. Lefforge v. State,
[883]
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129 Ind. 551, 29 N. E. 34 (1891).
In the instant case there is no con-
tention that this evidence of these
other hundred odd crimes is so re-
lated to the murder that it is there-
fore within proper bounds. Rather
the opinion concludes that since
the guilt of the defendant has been
determined by the plea of guilty
there is no need of the rigorous ex-
clusion of evidence of this type.
The rule requiring exclusion of
this kind of evidence finds its rea-
son for being in certain "Auxiliary
General Principles of Policy";
namely: 1. unaue prejudice might
be caused by taking it into con-
sideration; 2. unfair surprise would
handicap the defense; 3. confusion
of issues would result. 1 Wigmore,
Evidence §29a, Wharton, Criminal
Evidence (11th ed., 1935) §344.
The court argued that since the
guilt had been determined and
since it is merely a question of
meting out the punishment, this
evidence might be admitted. They
evidently felt that the "Principles
of Policy" were all matters appli-
cable in the determination of guilt
but are no longer pertinent once
guilt is determined.
Under the common law, the court
prescribed the punishment; even
in instances where alternative pun-
ishments were provided, the ques-
tion was for the court's discretion.
Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed.
1923) §934. But in some situations
the jury is given a voice in the fix-
ing of the punishment. Ark. Stat.
4039; Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) §4585;
Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936) §1136; Mo.
Stat. (1929) c. 29, Art. 13, §3703;
Ohio Stat. (Baldwin, 1934) §12400;
Tex. Code of Cr. Proc. (Vernon,
1936) Art. 502; Va. Stat. (Michie,
1936) §4784. This procedure of
having the jury fix the punish-
ment, however, has not been with-
out its critics. Kerr, A Needed Re-
form in Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky.
L. Rev. 107 (1918); Fuller, Crim-
inal Justice in Virginia, pp. 133,
139, 161 (1931); 24 Va. L. Rev. 463
(1937). Such criticism would well
lead one to question the feasibility
of this type of process.
In cases where the court is the
body which imposes the sentence
it seems to be a generally accepted
practice that evidence of other of-
fenses may be taken in considera-
tion by the court in determining
the sentence. 86 A. L. R. 833; 8
R. C. L. §269; 3 Wharton, Criminal
Procedure (10th ed. 1918) §1890;
Peterson v. United States, 246 Fed.
18 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); Meyers v.
People, 65 Colo. 450, 177 Pac. 145
(1918); People v. Popescue, 345 Ill.
142, 177 N. E. 739 (1931). The rule
obviously is different from that ap-
plied to evidence heard to deter-
mine guilt. People v. McWilliams,
348 Ill. 333, 180 N. E. 832 (1933).
The leading authority cited in the
principal case upholding the con-
tention that this evidence is prop-
erly in the scope of the jury's con-
sideration in setting the sentence is
the Illinois case, People v. Popes-
cue, supra. In that case there was
a cause tried before a judge on a
plea of guilty to a murder charge.
"The only question is whether the
trial judge erred in hearing evi-
dence of other crimes before exer-
cising his statutory discretion in
fixing the degree of punishment."
The court held in that particular
case that this evidence was prop-
erly to be considered. But the
opinion points out that the results
might be different if the jury were
the body to determine the punish-
ment. Thus the Popescue case,
which is the only case cited to up-
hold this conclusion in the noted
case would seem to be distinguished
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from the very situation for which
it is cited as precedent. More-
over there are other features by
which the cases are distinguishable
There the evidence of these other
crimes was not unrelated, but was
found relevant to the crime for
which the defendant was being
tried; it served to rebut the defense
that the killing was accidental and
as such would come within the ex-
ceptions previously considered and
would be good evidence even on
trial. People v. Folignos, 322 Ill.
304, 153 N. E. 373 (1926). Also
the court was conducting a hearing
under an Illinois Statute, Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1937) c. 38, §732, which
makes it mandatory if requested by
the State or by the defendant that
evidence in mitigation or aggrava-
tion be heard. People v. Penning-
ton, 267 Ill. 45, 107 N. E. 871 (1915).
Can we reason by analogy and
conclude that since the judge can
hear evidence of other offenses in
determining punishment in criminal
trials, therefore a jury is able to do
likewise? As a rule it does not
seem that this evidence is admis-
sible for the jury's consideration.
Wharton, Criminal Procedure,
§1890. In a situation nearly iden-
tical with that in the principal case
the court held that the defendant
had a right to have his punishment
fixed with reference only to the
circumstances of the crime of which
he has been found guilty. If this
evidence has been admitted it is not
possible for the court to say that
the jury in sentencing hasn't been
prejudiced by this evidence. Far-
ris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N. E.
821 (1889); People v. Meisner, 311
Ill. 40, 142 N. E. 482 (1924); Peo-
ple v. Hefferman, 312 Ill. 66, 143 N.
E. 411 (1924); it might close the
jury's mind to any lenience and
cause them to fix a death penalty
instead of a life term. Reppin v.
People, 95 Colo. 192, 34 P. (2d) 71
(1934). The court says in People
v. Corry, 349 Ill. 122, 181 N. 5. 603
(1932) that where the punishment
may vary, "the accused had the
right not only to have his guilt or
innocence of the particular charge
determined free from the prejudi-
cial effect of incompetent evidence,
but also to have his punishment,
when found guilty of the crime
charged, fixed solely with reference
to the facts and circumstances of
that crime, excluding from the
process of making such decision,
the consideration of other inde-
pendent and unrelated offenses."
On the basis of these cases to
which there seem to be few excep-
tions one might conclude that this
evidence was wrongly admitted for
jury consideration. Certainly there
is little authority in the instant
case which would serve as preced-
ent for the conclusion reached. It
seems to be the rule that where the
court is fixing the sentence after
the guilt has been determined, .it
can consider these other evidences.
But where the determining body is
the jury most decisions rule that
this evidence would prejudice the
resilting punishment and therefore
only incidents directly connected
with the charge should be allowed
to influence the final conclusion.
This difference in rules seems to
be an inconsistency in our criminal
practice, not to be justified on the
basis of the superior sense of judg-
ment which a court possesses as
compared with a lay jury. Rather
the difference in rules goes deeper
so as to involve considerations of
entirely different fields in deter-
mining the punishment the accused
must suffer. For the same crime
the judge in sentencing could scan
the whole character and past con-
duct of the accused; but the jury
would be limited to the relatively
narrow scope of incidents directly
related to the one crime of the
indictment. It truly seems to be
a double standard; one for the
judge, another for the jury. This
case, if followed, would establish
a uniform rule to be followed by
both the judge and jury by letting
them both consider the same fields.
The decision, however, has not sup-
ported its conclusion on the basis
of precedent cases, nor has it jus-
tified the result by considerations
of policy.
If one is to desire uniformity in
method of arriving at the punish-
ment, whichever process is elected
should be chosen only after con-
sideration of the larger question of
criminology of what purpose the
punishment is to serve. That the
historical basis of punishment arose
from an attitude of vengeance is
a truism which to the sociologist
requires little explanation. Mac-
Dougal defines the origin of pun-
ishment as "the binary compound
of anger and positive self feeling."
Even today that vengeance theory
is the basis of the attitude that
many lay persons have toward the
-treatment of the criminal. But to
most criminologists such an attitude
is too much like a debtor-creditor
agreement where the criminal, by
suffering his punishment which
corresponds to the price to be paid
for that particular breach of the
rules of *society, again gains the
right to commit another crime.
Such, it would seem would be the
result of attempting to isolate the
facts of the one particular crime
and render a corresponding pun-
ishment. This leaves no room for
any play of mitigation or aggrava-
tion but is rather an eye for eye-
tooth for tooth doctrine. This is
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the conclusion one must sustain if
they are to argue for exclusion of
other evidence in determining the
punishment.
Rather it would seem that the
ultimate purpose of imprisonment
is to protect society and the lives of
its members. To reach this end,
the punishing body could more apt-
ly consider facts of deterrence of
the commission of crime and the
prevention or restraint of it in the
future. Statistics support the gen-
eral supposition that a habitual
criminal is more likely to commit
crimes in the future than is a first
offender. Glueck and Glueck, Five
Hundred Criminal Careers (1933)
250-251. Certainly it would seem
that these previous elements of
other crimes which furnish a back-
ground for the criminal and to an
extent determine his moral turpi-
tude, and do admittedly correlate
with the record he will probably
have in the future, should be con-
sidered in punishing the person
guilty of the crime.
With this in mind it would seem
that the conclusion in the instant
case could be supported on doc-
trines taken from the fields of crim-
inology and sociology: that pun-
ishment determined with consid-
eration of former crimes would be
more apt to bring a result nearer
the ends of justice.
HAROLD CALKINS.
ABORTION-ATTEMPT TO ABORT A
NON-PREGNANT WOMAN - DYING
DECLARATIONS. - [Illinois] The
well-nigh impossible task of up-
holding a conviction in abortion
cases on appeal was again demon-
strated in a recent decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court. People v.
Holmes, 369 Il1. 624, 17 N. E. (2d)
562 (1938). That case, however,
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is of interest, not necessarily be-
cause of the above fact, but because
of the law which the Supreme
Court refused to decide. Deliver-
ing ari opinion without citing a
case, the court reversed the con-
viction without remanding on two
grounds.
The first ground for reversal was
based on the admission by the trial
judge of the deceased woman's oral
dying declaration. On May 10, 1938,
Grace Christensen, the deceased,
told hospital authorities that when
she knew she was near death she
would make a statement. On May
15, 1938, without any solicitation on
the part of the hospital authorities
she said she wished to make a
statement as she knew she was go-
ing to die. She repeated this sev-
eral times, and accused the defend-
ant of being responsible for her
condition. The hospital authorities,
in transcribing her statement sub-
stituted their language for hers,
and the trial judge held this written
statement inadmissible on the
ground that it was not in the words
of the deceased woman. The oral
statements of Mrs. Christensen,
from which the written statement
was taken, however, were admitted
into evidence, and this admission
the Supreme Court ruled errone-
ous, stating; one, that the record
failed to establish that the deceased
had given up all hope of living
when she made the written dec-
laration; two, that at no time was
deceased ever told by her physi-
cians or other qualified persons she
was going to die; and three, that
the genesis of both the oral and
written statements was the desire
of the hospital to obtain an excul-
patory statement to absolve it from
any blame in her death. The court
claims the statement was essen-
tially one of exoneration for the
hospital, not one of incrimination
of the defendant.
These propositions can be shortly
answered. First, the court confuses
the written declaration which was
not admitted and the oral declara-
tion which was held admissible.
Aside from this, however, the rec-
ord is replete with statements by
Mrs. Christensen that she knew she
was going to die. That she enter-
tained such a belief is strengthened
by the fact that on May 10th she
postponed making any statement
until she was certain she was near
death, and subsequently on May
15th, made the declaration saying
she knew she was dying. As early
as May 4th, the record shows, the
deceased woman had declared her-
self near death and had made plans
for- her own funeral. Statements
such as these are more than enough
to satisfy the Illinois rule, laid
down in People v. Cassesse, 251 Ill.
422, 425, 96 N. E. 274 (1911), that
the evidence must show the declar-
ant entertained a fixed belief and
a moral conviction that his death
was impending, that he had no hope
of recovery, that he despaired of
life and looked upon death as in-
evitable and at hand. Secondly,
there is no mention in the above
rule of the necessity of a plysicians
warning as to impending death. To
the contrary, in People v. Zachary,
310 Ill. 351, 141 N. E. 732 (1923),
the Illinois court held that to make
a dying declaration it was not nec-
essary for any physician to be pres-
ent. Whether this is still the rule
in Illinois we cannot be certain, for
the court in the instant case has
not met the issue squarely or clear-
ly, but only intimates that this may
no longer be the rule. Thirdly, the
court's theory that the statement is
one of exoneration is completely
exploded by the fact that there is
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no showing in the record that there
was any persuasion on the part of
the hospital authorities. Had there
been any effort on the part of the
hospital authorities to obtain the
statement, the court's point would
still not have been well taken. Peo-
ple v. Borella, 312 Ill. 34, 43, 143
N. E. 447 (1924) enunciated the
doctrine that such statements may
be solicited by officials.
The court also stresses the fact
that the deceased lived eleven days
after making her declaration. It is
interesting to note that in People
v. Kreutzer, 354 Ill. 430, 188 N. E.
422 (1933), the declarant lived nine
days after making her declaration,
and in People v. Cassesse (supra)
the declarant actually lived thirty-
five days after the statement was
made.
As a second ground for reversal,
the Court, completely misunder-
standing the theory of the People
as to just how the deceased woman
came to her death, rule that the
expert medical testimony for the
State did not over-balance such
testimony for the defense. It is ap-
parent from an examination of the
briefs of both the People and the
defendant that each contended Mrs.
Christensen died from a general
peritonitis which resulted from the
rupture of a tubo-ovarian abscess.
The State argued the rupture was
caused by the insertion of the in-
strument used in the attempted
abortion. The defendant claimed
the rupture was either spontaneous
or that it was caused after defend-
ant had treated her, by an opera-
tion performed by deceased's phy-
sicians in an effort to save her life.
The court seemingly was under the
impression that the defense alone
recognized the previous existence
of the abscess and that the People
were contending the abscess itself
was caused by the insertion of the
instrument in the attempt to pro-
cure the abortion. The court,
t hrefore. reversed without a nec-
essary understanding of the argu-
ments that were made.
The court, reversing on the above
two grounds left undecided a point
of law which has long been argued.
The defendant, who was not a phy-
sician and shown by other testi-
mony in the record to have made a
practice of performing abortions for
money, was charged with murder
by attempting to procure a miscar-
riage on a woman who was not
pregnant. The indictment was
drawn under the statute relative to
abortion, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch.
38, Sec. 3, which reads: "Whoever,
by means of any instrument, medi-
cine, drug or other means what-
ever, causes any woman pregnant
with child, to abort, or miscarry,
or attempts to procure or produce
an abortion or miscarriage, unless
the same were done as necessary
for the preservation of the mother's
life, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than one year
nor more than ten years; or if the
death of the mother results there-
from, the person procuring or caus-
ing the abortion or miscarriage
shall be guilty of murder." 1874,
March 27, R. S. 1874, p. 348, div. 1,
sec. 3. That the statute does cover
murder by attempted abortion as
decided in Clark v. People, 224 Ill.
554, 79 N. E. 941 (1906), the de-
fendant does not deny, but does ar-
gue that because of the impossi-
bility of performing an abortion or
an attempted abortion on a woman
not pregnant she could not be con-
victed under this indictment.
The defense contends that before
a crime can be committed under
this statute the act would have to
be done, in the language of the
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statute, on a woman "pregnant with
child." They say the party shall be
guilty of murder only "if the death
of the mother results therefrom"
(italics supplied), and cite, in sup-
port of this contention, the case of
Howard v. People, 185 Ill. 552, 57
N. E. 441 (1900). In that case the
Illinois court held the word
"mother" in section 3 (supra)
meant a woman pregnant with
child. There the indictment
charged the defendant with murder
by abortion on a woman pregnant
with child, and the court, faced
only with the problem of the suf-
ficiency of the indictment, held it
good saying that a woman pregnant
with child is a "mother" as used in
Section 3 (supra). The case is dis-
tinguishable on this point, the court
not having considered or faced the
problem of the instant case.
The argument in answer to de-
fendant's contention is that of leg-
islative intent. By no stretch of the
imagination does it seem possible
the legislature intended this statute
to be used as a means of escape
from one of the crimes it was at-
tempting to prevent. Even on the
grounds of statutory interpretation
there is an answer to the argument
of the defense. It will be observed
that Section 3 embraces two of-
fenses, that of abortion, and that of
attempt to abort. Of course, to
constitute the crime of completed
abortion the woman must be preg-
nant, and the phrase "woman preg-
nant with child" is found in that
part of the statute which deals with
that crime. These words are sig-
nificantly absent from the part of
the statute dealing with the crime
of attempted abortion. The more
sensible construction is that the
word "mother" as used in Section
3 was merely intended to describe
the person on whom the abortion
was attempted, and not that the
intent of the legislature was to ex-
clude an act of this kind from the
statute.
This contention of the defense
was squarely met in the case of
People v. Huff, 339 Ill. 328,171 N. E.
261 (1930), which was reversed be-
cause of an error in the indictment.
Although reversing, the court said
on page 333; "It is not necessary
to allege she was pregnant. It
would be impossible to procure a
miscarriage if she were not, but it
was not necessary to the making of
the attempt that she should be
pregnant. An attempt may be made
to commit a crime which it is im-
possible for the person making the
attempt to commit because of the
existence of conditions of which he
is ignorant." The court, in that
case, went on to say that the de-
fendant cannot take advantage of
a fact of which he did not know.
This is certainly the better rea-
soned argument. It is not conceiv-
able that a defendant, with every
other element of the crime present,
should go free because of the ab-
sence of a foetus. Whatever else
it did,. the Illinois Court should
have at least discussed and decided
this question. It is to be remem-
bered that the Huff case was re-
versed on other grounds, and with-
out a distinct holding on the point
the question is still a fairly open
one in Illinois.
Nowhere in the record is there
any denial by the defendant that
she did not perform any of the acts
of which she is accused in the dy-
ing declaration. There was testi-
mony at the trial to show she made
a practice of performing abortions.
She was not qualified in any way
for the practice of medicine or sur-
gery. Under all these facts there
can be no justification for a crime
such as this, yet the court gave her
her freedom after she had been
convicted by a jury of a crime
which she did not deny. There was
sufficient basis both on the law in
Illinois and the facts of the case for
a decision affirming the conviction.
It is clear the court should have
settled the law on this subject in
such a way as to leave no doubt
as to how it stood in future cases
concerning like situations. By re-
fusing to meet the issue squarely
the court has only succeeded in
confusing the law as to dying dec-
larations. Whichever way the court
ruled, a firm decision was needed
to clarify the law, thus insuring a
greater opportunity for the grant-
ing of justice, and a saving in time
and money for the people of the
state.
PETER WnsoN.
STAMPS- OBLIGATION OR OTHER
SEcumY-C-mTmEITING.- [Fed-
eral] In an action of libel, the
United States seized, and attempted
to have forfeited a stamp catalogue
which had been imported from
Switzerland through the mails.
This book had, on its face, an illus-
tration of a Swiss postage stamp in
green and within its covers were
black and white reproductions of
foreign stamps. The government
contended that the book was illegal
because the stamps were repro-
duced in violation of sections 220,
172 and 161 of the Criminal Code.
The District Court ultimately rests
its decision on sec. 161, and deter-
mines that the illustrations were
not obligations or securities within
the meaning of that act; and that
the catalogue was not subject to
seizure. United States v. One Zum-
stein Briefmarken Katalog, 24 F.
Supp. 516 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1938).
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Sec. 220 of the Code forbids any-
one from knowingly using any
forged or counterfeited stamps of
any foreign government. Knowl-
edge or belief of its counterfeit
character is an essential part of
passing counterfeit obligations.
Zottarelli v. United States, 20 F.
(2d) 795 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); Ha-
gan v. United States, 295 Fed. 656
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924). Since intent
is so necessary, and the govern-
ment readily conceded that there
was none here, this section as well
as section 172, wherein there is a
like requirement, are inapplicable,
and the District Court finds them
SO.
Penetrating the somewhat con-
fused arguments of counsel for the
United States, we see that the issue
is presented by an interpretation
of sec. 161, viz., is a foreign stamp
an obligation or other security of a
foreign government within the
meaning of the Act? The perti-
nent provisions of that section pro-
hibit the selling, printing or im-
porting of "any counterfeit plate
. . . engraving, print, obligation, or
other security of any foreign gov-
ernment." It is quite obvious that
these stamps are neither counter-
feit plates, engravings., or prints. If
the act is to have applicability at
all, it will be in analyzing the con-
notation of "obligations." There is
a decided dearth of cases dealing
with the definition and interpreta-
tion of these terms. A search pro-
duced but two cases involving that
section. Both cases are cited in
the court's opinion, and the dissent
of one, Biddle v. Luvisch, 287 Fed.
699 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923), is relied
on heavily. In that case, the ques-
tion arose on the sufficiency of an
indictment charging a violation of
section 161, and involving Canadian
excise stamps. Defendant pleaded
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guilty, and the court held that un-
der that plea, he had admitted the
allegations that the stamps were
obligations or securities of that
country, and that this relieved the
government from proving a foreign
law, of which courts could not take
judicial notice. At pp. 701, 702, the
Dissent held that the indictment
had assumed that the stamps were
obligations and had charged a
counterfeit of them; but, a stamp
shows on its face that it is not such
an obligation, and to say that it
-might be would be to import into
our law a foreign law as a n'ew
element of defining a crime. For-
eign stamps are not expressly in-
cluded in the statute as "obliga-
tions or other securities"; since
they are not so included, and since
Congress could have included them,
a contrary implication arises. See
also United States v. Luvisch, 17 F.
(2d) 200 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1927).
The fact situations in the princi-
pal case, and in the Biddle case,
supra, are so dissimilar, however,
that the decision in the latter,
though helpful, is far from con-
trolling.
A great deal, of course, depends
on the definition of the terms in
the dispute. Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary, 2d edition, de-
fines the words in question as fol-
lows: a "stamp" is "evidence that
the government's dues are paid";
an "obligation" is a "formal and
binding agreement or acknowledg-
ment of a liability to pay a certain
.sum or do a certain thing"; a "se-
curity" is "an evidence of debt or
of property, as a bond, stock cer-
tificate . . .; a document giving
the holder the right to demand and
receive property not in his poses-
sion."
Examining sec. 161 more closely,
can we say that the words "other
securities" have a special signifi-
cance, and that they should be con-
strued so as to include stamps
which were not specifically set forth
in the act? To do this-to give
them a flexible meaning in which
they would operate as a "catch-all"
-would seem to contravene, if not
repudiate, the doctrine "ejusdem
generis," that is when general
words follow the enumeration of
particular things, or persons, the
general words will be construed as
applying only to persons or things
of the same general nature as those
enumerated; this rule is especially
applicable to penal statutes. 59 C.
J., sec. 581, and cases there cited.
The words "other securities" are
words of a general character, and
under the doctrine just enunciated
we may conclude that "other se-
curity" means things of the same
general nature as "obligation"; a
stamp, even though an "other se-
curity," is hot a promise to pay or
do something but is rather dues for
a governmental service.
The stamps in the case at bar were
illustrations included in a stamp
catalogue, and were definitely not
to be lased for any other than phila-
telic purposes. Such a situation
as this seemed to be realized as
conceivable by Congress. Propon-
ents of the Act of March 3, 1923,
42 Stat. 1437, argued that since
there was a large group of phila-
telists in the country, and that
number was continually increasing,
that something be done to permit
them to increase their activities by
allowing them to issue and collect
defaced stamps. The Act allowed
printing and publishing of black
and white illustrations of foreign
stamps "from plates so defaced as
to indicate (they) are not adapted
or intended for use as stamps, or
to prevent or forbid making of nec-
892
essary plates therefor for use in
philatelic . . . articles or albums."
This act was a boon to stamp col-
lectors; but, more was to come. The
above act's amending act of Jan. 27,
1938, 56 Stat. 6, provided that
"nothing in secs. 161, 172, and 220
of the Criminal Code . . . shall be
construed to forbid or prevent .. .
importation .. .for philatelic pur-
poses .. .of black and white illus-
trations of: (1) foreign revenue
stamps if from plates so defaced as
to indicate illustrations are not
adapted or intended for use as
stamps; (2) foreign postage stamps."
Unless indicated otherwise, the
amended statute should be con-
strued as though the original had
been repealed and the new act
adopted in its amended form. Ap-
plying these principles to the sit-
uation at bar, there is little doubt
but that the legislation intended to
permit these black and white illus-
trations to be made; this the gov-
ernment's counsel graciously con-
cedes. And this whether the stamps
were or were not obligations of a
foreign power. In view of these
two acts the court's discussion of
sec. 161 in this connection seems
rather meaningless, although in-
formative. But, as the Amending
Act of 1938 was not passed until
after this case was in litigation, a
good explanation appears.
There remain but the two other
kinds of stamps to be disposed of;
the colored illustration on the cover,
and some black and white illustra-
tions of revenue stamps within.
The District Court holds that
though not coming within the ex-
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emption of the Amending act, still,
since they weren't obligations or
securities of a foreign country or
counterfeits, their importation for
philatelic purposes is not prohib-
ited.
It is rather difficult to believe
that the government was serious in
prosecuting-what appears to have
been its purpose was to present this
as a test case. Counsel for the
United States seems to have made
half-hearted attempts to throw out,
without any well-conceived plan,
some sections of the Code; and, in-
stead of pursuing his contentions,
be either conceded that he was in
the wrong, or failed to press his line
of attack. Apart from this, we can-
not see how the Court could, under
these conditions, have decided that
these were "obligations." We has-
ten to add that we do not contend
that stamps could never be obli-
gations of a government, for that
has been decided otherwise. In 20
0. A. G. 691, and 27 0. A. G. 125,
the Attorneys-General said: "that
postage stamps are not obligations
of the United States, except so long
as they remain uncancelled." In
this case, there is a different con-
sideration. The stamps were re-
produced in black and white and
were solely for philatelic purposes;
and, since there is no danger of
their being used for any other pur-
pose, we seriously doubt whether
Congress would prevent their im-
portation, even though they were
obligations. This position is con-
firmed by the Amending act of 1938
which allowed exactly that.
SELWYN COLEMAN.
